When Congress Prefers Presidential Action to Its Own Power

In a surprising and constitutionally significant development, a powerful bipartisan group of senators, after working for months on a massive Russia sanctions bill, have suddenly hit the brakes. The reason? President Trump has threatened to do their job for them, unilaterally.

Instead of fighting for their institutional prerogative, the senators are applauding the President’s move and willingly ceding the field.

This is not a story about a typical Washington power struggle. It is a story about the quiet erosion of legislative authority, not through a presidential power grab, but through congressional acquiescence.

The moment raises a profound question about the state of our republic: Has Congress become so accustomed to a dominant executive in foreign policy that it now prefers presidential action to exercising its own constitutional powers?

The Hammer and the Sledgehammer

For months, Senators Lindsey Graham (R-SC) and Richard Blumenthal (D-CT) have been crafting what Blumenthal calls a “sledgehammer”: a bill to impose crippling sanctions on Russia’s war machine by targeting its energy trade with countries like China and India.

Their goal was to force Congress to take a strong, unified stand against Russian aggression.

That legislative effort has now been sidelined by the President’s own threat, which Blumenthal describes as a “hammer.” In a sudden move, President Trump announced he would levy 100% tariffs against Moscow to pressure Vladimir Putin to end the war in Ukraine. Rather than crying foul over executive overreach, the bipartisan duo praised the President’s hardened stance.

Graham called it a “game changer,” and both senators agreed to give the President “runway” to see his own plan through.

An Abdication of Article I Authority

This deference is a remarkable moment in the long history of the separation of powers. The Constitution, in Article I, Section 8, is unambiguous.

It grants Congress, and only Congress, the power “To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,” “To lay and collect… Duties, Imposts and Excises,” and “To declare War.”

The power to impose sanctions and tariffs is one of the most fundamental powers of the legislative branch.

The senators’ willingness to step aside represents a significant chapter in the story of congressional acquiescence to the “imperial presidency.” They are not fighting to protect their institution’s constitutional role; they are actively encouraging the President to assume it.

While they correctly note that having Congress’s blessing “is good for the president” legally and politically, they are content to let him act alone. This raises a critical question: If Congress outsources its most explicit powers, what is left of its function as a co-equal branch of government?

The Allure of Executive Speed and Power

Why would senators from both parties, who have dedicated immense effort to their own legislation, willingly step aside? The answer lies in a pragmatic and constitutionally dangerous calculation: the allure of executive efficiency.

Passing major, controversial legislation is a slow, difficult, and often messy process. A presidential tariff threat, enacted through authority previously delegated by Congress through acts like the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), is fast, powerful, and commands immediate global attention.

The senators appear to have concluded that achieving their shared policy goal of punishing Russia is more important than the process by which it is achieved.

They are, in essence, outsourcing their constitutional duty to a branch of government they believe can act with more speed and force. This pragmatic choice, however, comes at a steep price for the long-term health of our republic.

This bipartisan “runway” for the President is a telling sign of our constitutional times. It reveals a Congress that has become so accustomed to a powerful executive in foreign affairs that it sometimes views its own role as secondary or supportive, rather than primary.

While this specific instance may be for a policy goal many Americans agree with, the precedent is a perilous one. A Congress that willingly cedes its power on one issue will find it harder to reclaim it on the next. The system of checks and balances cannot function if one branch decides it’s simply easier to let another do its job.